News Report Follows 30 Days After Dieppe Raid.
Headline in Hamilton Spectator, Sept 18. 1942.
Second Sub-Heading raises a serious question (?).
Had Germany's forces at Dieppe been warned?
August 19 of this year (2017) will mark the 75th anniversary of the Dieppe Raid. A good deal of material about that significant raid has already been shared on this website - and in many many books and reports - and I am certain a good deal more will be shared this year and in the future, here and by several other sources.
A few weeks after the long-remembered raid took place, lengthy reports appeared in newspapers, at home and abroad.
Ottawa, Sept. 18. - (CP) - Following is the text of the official statement on the Dieppe operation last month, released today by Defence Minister Ralston:
It is now possible to give somewhat fuller details of the combined operation against the enemy forces in the Dieppe area carried out August 19 by forces which included a large body of the Canadian army overseas. This account is based upon the preliminary report made by the military force commander (Major-Gen. J.H. Roberts, officer commanding the Second Canadian Division), and upon examination of personal reports made by many participants, including a large number of N.C.O.s and private soldiers, as well as information from other sources.
Impossible to Tell Full Story of Raid
It is obvious that many facts concerning operations of this particular nature cannot be revealed without affording the enemy information which he is very anxious to obtain. It is therefore impossible to tell the full story of the Dieppe operation at the present time; but it is the purpose of the present statement to describe the operation as fully as possible without giving assistance to the enemy.
Objectives of Operation To Seek Information
The united nations have an agreed offensive policy. In the preparation and development of such a policy the acquisition of the fullest possible information concerning the enemy's strength and dispositions, and every other element in the situation affecting the conduct of operations against him, is a matter of the most fundamental importance.
Such information is available from many sources, but it is frequently the case that facts essential to the successful prosecution of offensive operations can only be gained by fighting for them.
The Dieppe operation must be regarded in this light. It was, in fact, a reconnaissance in force conceived with the important object of obtaining information and experience vital to the general offensive program.
Practical Experience Necessary For Troops
It was considered most important that our forces should have an opportunity for practical experience in the landing on an enemy-occupied coast of a large military force, and in particular in the problems arising out of the employment in such a force of heavy armoured fighting vehicles.
The strategic objectives of the operation now have been outlined in very general terms. It also had what may be termed tactical or local objectives involving the destruction of enemy installations in the Dieppe area and the infliction of as much local damage as possible upon the enemy. It is impossible to discuss these objectives in detail.
The task of carrying out these operations against a well-fortified and strongly-held coast line was one that could be entrusted only to troops of a very high standard of training and general quality.
McNaughton Satisfied Objectives Vital
Preliminaries of the operation before the employment of Canadian military forces was approved by the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian army (Lieut.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton), he had satisfied himself that the objectives of the proposed operation were vital to the agreed offensive policy and that the means available were likely to be adequate for the task at hand.
The planning of the enterprise, so far as the Canadian military forces were concerned, was directed by General Roberts, the military force commander. Canadian plans were concerted with the chief of combined operations (Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten) by Lieut.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, general officer commanding a Canadian corps.
In all combined operations, there is a force commander for each service element involved. At Dieppe while the military force commander, as already stated, was General Roberts, the naval force commander was Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., and the air force commander was Air Marshal T. Leigh-Mallory.
Brigadiers Southam, Lett in Active Command
The Canadian military force involved was composed basically of large elements of two brigades of the Second Canadian Division, commanded by Brigadiers W.W. Southam of Toronto, and S. Lett of Vancouver, and a battalion of the First Canadian army tank brigade. The Canadian army troops engaged comprised about 5,000 all ranks. In addition, detachments of all arms and services played essential parts in the operation.
Units of the Second Canadian Division were chosen because, although these troops had been in the United Kingdom since 1940, they had had no opportunities for active employment such as had fallen to troops of the First Canadian Division in France in June of 1940 and in the expedition to Spitzbergen in 1941.
The First Canadian army tank brigade was the first Canadian armoured formation to arrive in the United Kingdom, which it reached in June, 1941. All the troops chosen for the enterprise were in a high state of general training, apart from the additional and special training which they received for this operation.
In addition to the Canadian forces, the military units employed included the third, fourth and Royal Marine "A" commandos (special service brigade troops), as well as small detachments of United States Rangers and Fighting French troops.
"Part of the assault fleet gathered for Operation Jubilee"
Photo credit - DND / National Archives of Canada
The naval force participating included no vessels larger than destroyers and was composed primarily of various types of landing craft and support craft. In addition to vessels of the Royal Navy, the force included a Polish destroyer and some Fighting French chasseurs.
Entire Operation Carefully Prepared
The air force consisted of units from all operational commands of the Royal Air Force, from the Royal Canadian Air Force, the United States Army Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and Polish, Czech, Norwegian, Belgian and Fighting French squadrons.
The operation was most carefully prepared in advance in every detail. The officers charged with planning the operation had at their disposal a great mass of information related to the Dieppe area, collected from many sources. The proposed operation was checked on a large-scale model of the area to be raided, and when the plans were completed a most thorough understanding had been established between the three services.
The forces to be employed in the enterprise were subjected to an intensive special program of combined operations training. While details of this training cannot be given, it is possible to state that the Canadian military units chosen to participate were trained on suitable terrain within the United Kingdom where conditions could be considered to approximate those in which the operation was to be conducted.
Most careful precautions were taken for the maintenance of secrecy. Special means were used to conceal the movement of troops. Thanks to the precautions taken it is believed that the enemy, in spite of the size of the force involved and the necessary magnitude of the preparations, had no information that a specific operation against the Dieppe area was projected.
However, in consequence of our avowed aggressive policy, he had been strengthening his position on the French coast generally, and during the raid it became clear that the enemy had recently brought additional troops and guns into the Dieppe area. This appears to have been done as part of a general policy of reinforcement of coastal areas. The Germans on the French coast were therefore in what may be called a state of general alert.
Photo - As found in The Globe and Mail, Toronto, Sept. 19, 1942
Topography of Dieppe Area and Operation Plan
The town of Dieppe lies at the mouth of the River d'Arques, which provided a fairly spacious harbour lying to the south and east of the town. East of the river and harbour is a lofty headland overlooking the town and a similar headland lies immediately to the west.
On a great part of the coast in this vicinity cliffs make a landing from the sea virtually impossible, but there are areas of low ground providing avenues to the interior in the vicinity of Puits, a little more than a mile to the east of the river, and Pourville, situated at the mouth of the River Scie, about a mile and a half west of the town.
The beach immediately in front of Dieppe itself is suitable for landing operations, but the approach to the town is obstructed by a sea-wall which the Germans had turned into a more formidable obstacle by the use of heavy barbed wire, while the beach is also commanded by the headlands on either side.
Deliver Assaults at Coastal Batteries
The plan for the operation provided that assaults should be delivered by special service brigade troops against enemy coastal batteries at Varengeville, roughly five miles west of Dieppe, and Berneval, roughly six miles east of the town. The capture or disablement of the enemy guns at these points was considered necessary to the safety of our naval vessels offshore and the successful execution of the landing operations closer to the town.
Simultaneously with the special service brigade attacks at these places, Canadian forces were to land at Pourville and Puits. The troops landed at Puits were to secure the headland east of Dieppe, from which the enemy would otherwise be in a position to menace landings attempted on the beach in front of the town itself.
The main attack was to be delivered against the front of the town, following a naval and air bombardment. Heavy tanks were to be employed in this attack in support of the Canadian infantry.
The need for knowledge and experience concerning the transport and landing of tanks was fundamental to the operational plan. The tanks once ashore, it was, of course, hoped to re-embark if conditions were favourable. Orders were given, however, that tanks were to be disabled and left behind if it were a choice of re-embarking men or machines.
More to follow.
Please link to Article: Dad Had Sailed These Same Waters
Unattributed Photos GH
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