A Chronicle of the Allied Campaign in Sicily and Italy
By Lionel S. B. Shapiro, of The Montreal Gazette
The Foreword is dated 'London, 23rd February, 1944'
I read on the front fly leaf that "the highlight of the book is the dramatic account of the Salerno landings." Though I have read only 33 of the book's 107 pages, I have encountered other highlights as well, related to scenes and events that would be familiar to Canadians who served in Combined Operations, i.e., aboard landing crafts in Sicily and Italy in 1943.
A few excerpts are provided below:
Leaving England Behind
The next morning I detrained at a little town
and was driven to the concentration area of a
Canadian Army Tank Brigade...
The Brigade had been concentrated in the area
for a month. Some of its units with tanks had already
gone forward to be loaded on L.S.T.'s (landing ship tank).
This is the flat-bottomed type designed by Andrew Higgins
of New Orleans for amphibious operations.
It is capable of long sea voyages,
and when it runs up on a beach,
its square prow opens like a drawbridge
so that the tanks can roll off on land.
"You'll see regiments out there, young man,"
"You'll see regiments out there, young man,"
the brigadier said to me at breakfast.
"I'm proud of them. They're keen as mustard.
They've been here two years waiting to go into action,
but we in the tanks have had no morale problem.
We've had our equipment headaches - but that's
another story. Our morale has always been first class."
We were off to the wars.
In the bay a flotilla of troop transports floated at anchor.
Handsome ships they were, some easily recognizable
despite their drab colouring. Not far away were ships
of the Royal Navy, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft-carriers.
Through the protective boom our convoy of ocean liners
moved in single file. These were all fast ships.
The slower L.S.T.'s carrying our tanks sailed before us.
"... I knew at once the supreme purpose of sea power in a world war ..."
Photo Credit. They Left the Back Door Open As found on Page 14
The next morning we were in open sea.
The vista from the boat deck was both proud and terrifying.
Etched across the horizon in every direction
steamed British and American destroyers, the legs,
eyes and arms of this solid body of great ships.
Closer in were bigger warships of the Royal Navy,
their glinting guns making communion with the morning sky.
And overhead aircraft of Coastal Command circled around
giving us a feeling of easy confidence.
As I looked upon this magnificent panorama I knew
at once the supreme purpose of sea power in a world war.
In these ships a fully equipped army was sailing safely and confidently
on a split-minute schedule toward a point of our own choosing.
We were circling the Fortress Europe, reserving the oceans,
greatest of all highways, for our exclusive use
and denying it to the enemy.
Our ships cut serenely across a painted ocean.
In the distance the destroyers raced proud and impudent
like thoroughbred terriers. This was our highway.
Passages from pages 14 - 18
The Eighth Army nibbled off Pachino peninsula
at the extreme south-east corner of the island and
two days later captured the port of Syracuse.
The Seventh Army landed on Sicily's beaches
around Gela, almost dead centre of the south coast.
From these two modest points of invasion, involving
the minimum gamble allowed such an operation,
the two armies fanned out driving the Germans before them,
never defeating any substantial number, never cutting them off.
... Had we played boldly,
we would have won a spectacular victory.
Instead, we pushed the enemy out of Sicily and we were confronted
by the same German units when we landed on the Italian mainland...
The passage continues:
The assault on Sicily developed exactly as it was planned.
In most sectors* our troops swarmed ashore without serious opposition;
in isolated places where resistance was offered, it was quickly beaten down.
Our forces proceeded inland as blueprinted and well ahead of schedule...
Defence of the coast had been entrusted to local Italian regiments
made up of poorly-trained and ridiculously-equipped home guards,
and they stampeded to the safety of our prisoner of war cages
on the beaches in such terrified disorder that our troops faced
greater danger from being trampled upon than from bullets.
Except at Gela where General Patton's men fought a brisk action,
the southernmost bulwark of the Fortress Europe was as secure
as a country gate swinging in the wind. Within 24 hours
the beaches were organized for reception of supplies and our
lines stretched 10 to 15 miles inland with perfect security.
It will be said, and probably correctly,
that the most valuable new weapon we developed
in this war was the simply constructed landing craft.
This type of vessel which has a shallow draught
capable of negotiating a beach of normal gradient and
a square prow which when lowered becomes a serviceable ramp,
has been turned out by the thousands in the United States
and has made possible all our amphibious operations.
For it must be remembered that a successful assault on
an enemy-held beach is less than half the battle.
The outcome depends less on the quality of shock troops
than on the efficiency of supply lines. In our offensive against
the Fortress Europe, which necessitates in nearly every case landings
from the sea, the enemy has depended on his interior supply lines.
We have resolved this difficulty with the L.C.I.
(landing craft infantry) and the L.S.T. (landing ship tank).
Passages from pages 34 - 35
In a very significant book entitled The Watery Maze, by Bernard Fergusson (highly recommended for readers who desire more information about the growth and operations undertaken by the Combined Operations organization, and how Canadians came to be involved), we read that Prime Minister Winston Churchill was very aware, early on, that to fight and win an amphibious war successfully, ship- and landing craft-building would need to take precedence. ("As the enemy held all the ports, we must be able to land over beaches." )
More ships would also mean... more crews!
Obviously two of the most urgent problems were the provision
of landing ships and craft, and the crews to man them.
... as an illustration of the magnitude of the crew problem,
the Joint Planners, in the very month of Mountbatten's appointment,
had persuaded the Chiefs of Staff that our requirements in LCTs alone
for the eventual invasion would be 2,250 - a figure to daunt almost anybody.
And where were the crews to come from? Canada made an offer,
which was gratefully accepted, of 50 officers and 300 ratings,
but this was a drop in the bucket.
Excerpt from page 93.
More to follow from They Left the Back Door Open.
Please link to Passages: "Ticket to Hell via Dieppe" by A. Robert Prouse (2).
eyes and arms of this solid body of great ships.
Closer in were bigger warships of the Royal Navy,
their glinting guns making communion with the morning sky.
And overhead aircraft of Coastal Command circled around
giving us a feeling of easy confidence.
As I looked upon this magnificent panorama I knew
at once the supreme purpose of sea power in a world war.
In these ships a fully equipped army was sailing safely and confidently
on a split-minute schedule toward a point of our own choosing.
We were circling the Fortress Europe, reserving the oceans,
greatest of all highways, for our exclusive use
and denying it to the enemy.
Our ships cut serenely across a painted ocean.
In the distance the destroyers raced proud and impudent
like thoroughbred terriers. This was our highway.
Passages from pages 14 - 18
Drawing by Canadian James Reidford,
The Montreal Star, November 2, 1943
* * * * *
The Most Valuable New Weapon in World War II
at the extreme south-east corner of the island and
two days later captured the port of Syracuse.
The Seventh Army landed on Sicily's beaches
around Gela, almost dead centre of the south coast.
From these two modest points of invasion, involving
the minimum gamble allowed such an operation,
the two armies fanned out driving the Germans before them,
never defeating any substantial number, never cutting them off.
... Had we played boldly,
we would have won a spectacular victory.
Instead, we pushed the enemy out of Sicily and we were confronted
by the same German units when we landed on the Italian mainland...
Canadians manned landing crafts at Avola (on map) and Noto (south of Avola)
Map of Sicily as found in Combined Operations by Clayton Marks
Map of Sicily as found in Combined Operations by Clayton Marks
The passage continues:
The assault on Sicily developed exactly as it was planned.
In most sectors* our troops swarmed ashore without serious opposition;
in isolated places where resistance was offered, it was quickly beaten down.
Our forces proceeded inland as blueprinted and well ahead of schedule...
Defence of the coast had been entrusted to local Italian regiments
made up of poorly-trained and ridiculously-equipped home guards,
and they stampeded to the safety of our prisoner of war cages
on the beaches in such terrified disorder that our troops faced
greater danger from being trampled upon than from bullets.
Except at Gela where General Patton's men fought a brisk action,
the southernmost bulwark of the Fortress Europe was as secure
as a country gate swinging in the wind. Within 24 hours
the beaches were organized for reception of supplies and our
lines stretched 10 to 15 miles inland with perfect security.
It will be said, and probably correctly,
that the most valuable new weapon we developed
in this war was the simply constructed landing craft.
Pachino37. Landing Craft, Mechanised (LCM), the workhorse of d-days
This type of vessel which has a shallow draught
capable of negotiating a beach of normal gradient and
a square prow which when lowered becomes a serviceable ramp,
has been turned out by the thousands in the United States
and has made possible all our amphibious operations.
For it must be remembered that a successful assault on
an enemy-held beach is less than half the battle.
The outcome depends less on the quality of shock troops
than on the efficiency of supply lines. In our offensive against
the Fortress Europe, which necessitates in nearly every case landings
from the sea, the enemy has depended on his interior supply lines.
We have resolved this difficulty with the L.C.I.
(landing craft infantry) and the L.S.T. (landing ship tank).
Passages from pages 34 - 35
An L.C.I. (L) (L for Large) (left) and L.C.T. (C for Craft) (right) land off the beach
during Operation Husky, invasion of Sicily. Photo - Imperial War Museum (IWM)
Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs) (left and centre) with prows open and a supply
brigade, likely including Italian prisoners, in Sicily. An L.C.I. (L) (right) has
its gangplanks (steps) down so troops can disembark. Photo - IWM
In a very significant book entitled The Watery Maze, by Bernard Fergusson (highly recommended for readers who desire more information about the growth and operations undertaken by the Combined Operations organization, and how Canadians came to be involved), we read that Prime Minister Winston Churchill was very aware, early on, that to fight and win an amphibious war successfully, ship- and landing craft-building would need to take precedence. ("As the enemy held all the ports, we must be able to land over beaches." )
More ships would also mean... more crews!
Obviously two of the most urgent problems were the provision
of landing ships and craft, and the crews to man them.
... as an illustration of the magnitude of the crew problem,
the Joint Planners, in the very month of Mountbatten's appointment,
had persuaded the Chiefs of Staff that our requirements in LCTs alone
for the eventual invasion would be 2,250 - a figure to daunt almost anybody.
And where were the crews to come from? Canada made an offer,
which was gratefully accepted, of 50 officers and 300 ratings,
but this was a drop in the bucket.
Excerpt from page 93.
More to follow from They Left the Back Door Open.
Please link to Passages: "Ticket to Hell via Dieppe" by A. Robert Prouse (2).
Unattributed Photos GH
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